Introducing the Doctrinal Event-Response Predictor.
Sixty years of PRC doctrine treated as a retrieval corpus. Given a global event, the predictor emits a structured ex-ante claim about the frame, tier, lever, and window of Beijing's response — and gets scored once the response lands.
A structured forecaster on top of sixty years of doctrine
On 7 October 2022 the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security published its advanced-computing rule against the PRC chip industry. Inside twenty-four hours, MOFCOM and the MFA produced a struggle-and-self-reliance-framed rhetorical response. Ten months later, MOFCOM imposed gallium and germanium export controls. Twelve months later, Big Fund Phase III was finalized. The substantive cascade ran for a year. None of this was unforeseeable from the corpus: Xi's 2018 CAS/CAE self-reliance keynote, the 2020 People's Daily dual-circulation editorial, and Mao's 1956 Ten Major Relationships all pre-figured the response template.
This paper builds a structured predictor on top of that observation. Twelve doctrinal anchor passages from 1949 to 2024 carry the lineage. Nine historical event-response pairs from 2018 to 2026 are the eval set, with the realized frame, escalation tier, primary policy lever, and timing window all known. The predictor scores a held-out event against the rest, on all four dimensions, with the registry append-only. We log one live ex-ante prediction at release: the PRC response to the May 2026 talent-curb expansion is forecast as a self-reliance-framed response at tier 4, with talent restriction as the primary policy lever, within approximately 257 days. The prediction resolves on 7 February 2027.
The doctrine is the grammar of every response
State responses to foreign actions don't come from nowhere. They route through a sixty-year register: Mao on humiliation and self-reliance, Deng on hide-and-bide and selective opening, Jiang on the Eight Points, Hu on the Scientific Outlook, Xi on rejuvenation, struggle, and new-quality productive forces. The corpus is dated, sourced, and indexed. The grammar an export control or a Taiwan incident gets framed in is bounded by the passages the response's authors are willing to invoke. So the response is partially predictable from the corpus alone.
The point is not novelty of underlying data — the public doctrinal record is what it is. The contribution is a willingness to commit a structured number, on a specific event, with a fixed resolution date, in a form that can be marked right or wrong twelve months later. Mistakes are permanent in the registry. The May 2026 talent-curb expansion is the first live prediction.
The corpus, the eval set, and the live call
The three-tab board below is the working surface for the rest of the paper. Tab 1 carries the doctrinal corpus — 15 anchor passages from 1949 to 2024, filterable by era and theme, plotted on a four-era timeline. Tab 2 carries the nine historical event-response pairs from 2018 to 2026, with frame / tier / lever filters and a timeline that places each event on its realized tier lane. Tab 3 carries the open live prediction (May 2026 talent-curb expansion, resolving 7 February 2027) and the three-baseline leave-one-out backtest.
| § | Era | Date | Speaker / venue | Title (中文) | Working summary | Themes / verif. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| §1.1 | Mao | 21 Sep 1949 | Mao Zedong 1st CPPCC opening session, Beiping | 中国人民站起来了 Stood Up | The Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up. … Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. V (FLP) | sovereignty, national rejuvenation, struggle Placeholder |
| §1.2 | Mao | 25 Apr 1956 | Mao Zedong Enlarged meeting, CPC Politburo | 论十大关系 Ten Relationships | Learn from the strong points of all nations while refusing to copy mechanically. Establish self-reliance with selective foreign learning as the template: internal market primary, external links supplementary. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. V (FLP 1977) | self-reliance, industrial policy, selective opening Placeholder |
| §1.3 | Deng | 13 Dec 1978 | Deng Xiaoping Central Working Conference (Third Plenum prelude) | 解放思想,实事求是,团结一致向前看 Emancipate the Mind | When everything has to be done by the book, when thinking turns rigid and blind faith is the fashion, it is impossible for a party or a nation to make progress. Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. II (FLP 1994) | peaceful rise, self-reliance, opening up Placeholder |
| §1.4 | Deng | Jan–Feb 1992 | Deng Xiaoping Southern Tour — Wuchang / Shenzhen / Zhuhai / Shanghai | 在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点 Southern Tour | Development is the absolute principle (发展才是硬道理). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III | peaceful rise, growth primacy, stay the course Placeholder |
| §1.5 | Jiang–Hu | 30 Jan 1995 | Jiang Zemin Spring Festival reception, Taiwan Affairs Office | 为促进祖国统一大业的完成而继续奋斗 Eight Points | Adhering to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful reunification. We do not commit to renouncing the use of force, [directed] not against our compatriots in Taiwan but against the schemes of foreign forces. China.org.cn official English translation | sovereignty, reunification, struggle Placeholder |
| §1.6 | Jiang–Hu | 15 Oct 2007 | Hu Jintao 17th National Congress of the CPC | 高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜,为夺取全面建设小康社会新胜利而奋斗 Scientific Outlook | The Scientific Outlook on Development (科学发展观) is the guiding ideology, paired with the harmonious society frame: comprehensive, balanced, sustainable development, with people-first and peaceful development as core principles. Xinhuanet official English translation | peaceful rise, common prosperity, scientific development Placeholder |
| §1.7 | Xi | 29 Nov 2012 | Xi Jinping 'Road to Rejuvenation', National Museum of China | (People's Daily front-page report; no titled essay) Chinese Dream | Realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese dream of the Chinese nation in modern times. People's Daily 2012-11-30 front-page | sovereignty, national rejuvenation Placeholder |
| §1.8 | Xi | 18 Oct 2017 | Xi Jinping 19th National Congress of the CPC | 决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利 New Era | Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. The principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved — what we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life. China Daily official English (chinadaily.com.cn) | new era, principal contradiction, common prosperity Placeholder |
| §1.9 | Xi | 28 May 2018 | Xi Jinping Joint CAS / CAE conference | 核心技术要掌握在自己手里 Self-Reliance Keynote | Self-reliance is the foundation for the Chinese nation to stand among the nations of the world. Core technologies must be in our own hands. Xinhua English wire, 28–29 May 2018 | self-reliance, indigenous innovation, core technologies Placeholder |
| §1.10 | Xi | 2 Jan 2019 | Xi Jinping Great Hall of the People (40th anniv. 'Message to Compatriots') | 为实现民族伟大复兴 推进祖国和平统一而共同奋斗 Taiwan Reunification | China must be reunified, and will surely be reunified. We do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. Xinhuanet English translation, 2019-01-02 | sovereignty, reunification, struggle Placeholder |
| §1.11 | Xi | 17 Aug 2020 | Ren Zhongping / Zhong Xuanli (editorial pseudonyms) PD commentary series after 30 Jul Politburo meeting | (任仲平 / 钟轩理) Dual Circulation | Building a new development pattern with the domestic great circulation as the main body and the domestic and international dual circulations mutually reinforcing. People's Daily print archive, people.com.cn/digest/ | self-reliance, dual circulation, industrial strategy Placeholder |
| §1.12 | Xi | 17 Aug 2021 | Xi Jinping 10th meeting, Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission | 习近平主持召开中央财经委员会第十次会议 Common Prosperity | Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and a key feature of Chinese-style modernization. Promote common prosperity through high-quality development, properly handle efficiency and equity, and construct foundational arrangements coordinating primary distribution, redistribution, and third distribution. gov.cn official Xinhua-sourced readout | common prosperity, redistribution, third distribution Placeholder |
| §1.13 | Xi | 10 Aug 2022 | Taiwan Affairs Office + State Council Information Office Joint white paper (post-Pelosi) | 台湾问题与新时代中国统一事业 Taiwan White Paper | Drops the 1993 and 2000 white papers' commitment to refrain from sending troops or administrators to Taiwan post-reunification — a substantive doctrinal escalation. SCIO English release | sovereignty, reunification, post-Pelosi codification Placeholder |
| §1.14 | Xi | 1 Jun 2024 | Xi Jinping Qiushi 《求是》, Issue 11 | 发展新质生产力是推动高质量发展的内在要求和重要着力点 New-Quality Forces | New-quality productive forces (新质生产力) are advanced productivity emancipated from traditional economic growth modes and productive force development paths, with the characteristics of high technology, high efficiency, and high quality. Qiushi English edition, qstheory.cn | new-quality productive forces, self-reliance, high-quality development Placeholder |
| §1.15 | Xi | 18 Jul 2024 | CPC Central Committee (3rd Plenum, 20th CC) Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, Beijing | 中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第三次全体会议公报 Third Plenum | Further comprehensively deepen reform and advance Chinese-style modernization. A high-level socialist market economy system is a crucial safeguard for Chinese-style modernization. gov.cn official Chinese communique | deepening reform, new development pattern, common prosperity Placeholder |
The founding corpus shipped with twelve anchors; a later update loaded the three deferred Xi-era anchors (the 2017 19th Congress political report, the 2021 common-prosperity speech, and the 2024 Third Plenum communique) into the live retrieval index, widening the corpus to fifteen.
What the nine pairs reveal
The response template is stable on two axes and unstable on a third. On frame and tier, the categorical mapping is sticky: U.S. export-control events land on a self-reliance frame at tier 4 in seven of seven cases since 2020; Taiwan-incident events land on a sovereignty frame at tier 5. That stickiness is what the most-common-by-category baseline picks up — it clears 67% framing accuracy. The unstable axis is lever: the modal response inside the U.S. export-control category oscillates between subsidy (2020, 2022, 2023) and retaliatory export control (2018, 2024) depending on the specific U.S. package and where the PRC is in its industrial-policy cycle. That is where doctrinal retrieval has to do real work. The May 2026 talent-curb expansion is the diagnostic case: the lever is novel (talent restriction), but the doctrinal lineage (Xi's 2018 self-reliance keynote plus the 2024 essay on new quality productive forces) was retrievable from the corpus six months in advance.
The first ex-ante scored claim
Bloomberg's 26 May 2026 report on the PRC expansion of AI-talent travel curbs to private firms is the launch event. The corpus treats the event itself as a same-day self-reliance and talent-restriction response. The forward call — visible on the Live forecast tab above — is on the substantive cascade: the state-media codification and subsidy follow-on expected over the next eight months, on the same lag template the 2022 U.S. export-control package produced.
Falsification criterion.Within 257 days of 26 May 2026, official state media (People's Daily, Xinhua, or Qiushi) or a State Council, commerce-ministry, or defence-ministry notice produces a follow-on response framed primarily in self-reliance terms whose dominant policy instrument is talent restriction, with escalation observed at tier 3 or higher.
What would falsify this in 257 days. The call resolves againstthe predictor if any of these dominates the response: (a) the PRC reverses the May 2026 travel curbs, signalling a peaceful-rise pivot; (b) state media reframes the talent-restriction track as a common-prosperity measure; (c) the dominant follow-on lever is a military-posture change or a sanction against a named U.S. firm with no parallel talent-restriction codification; (d) no follow-on Politburo readout, commerce-ministry notice, or front-page People's Daily commentary cites the May 2026 measures by 7 February 2027 at all; (e) the cascade lands but at tier 1 or 2 only.
Five moving parts, each versioned
Corpus. Twelve anchor passages at first release (widened to fifteen in a later update) spanning four eras, Mao through Xi. Each entry carries structured speaker, venue, and date metadata, the working English text, a translation-provenance tier, and a verification-status flag.
Pipeline. Retrieval is theme-overlap scoring: each event carries a category-prior theme set; each passage carries its dominant theme tags; their intersection size, multiplied by a source weight (Xi-era state media 1.0, pre-Xi historical 0.6), with a recency tiebreaker, is the retrieval score. The top-K passages enter the prediction call. The current release uses a deterministic stub model for the structured-output step; the language-model swap is scheduled for a later release, with no API contract change.
Output taxonomies. Seven frames: self-reliance, struggle, common prosperity, peaceful rise, sovereignty, new quality productive forces, and whole-process democracy. Five escalation tiers: rhetorical only, symbolic action, economic countermeasure, sectoral policy lever, and military-posture change. Seven policy levers: rhetorical only, subsidy, sanction, retaliatory export control, military posture, talent restriction, and unspecified. Window is in integer days.
Baselines. Three classical baselines run on every backtest: random over the closed taxonomies (floor), most-common-by-category using the modal training response inside the event's category, and nearest-neighbor copying the most similar prior event by category match and recency. The stub model has to clear all three on framing top-1 accuracy, tier mean absolute error, and lever F1 to count as evidence of doctrinal retrieval lift.
Metrics.Framing top-1 accuracy on the seven-way frame label. Escalation-tier mean absolute error on the 1–5 ordinal. Lever F1 micro-averaged across the seven-way closed lever set. Window calibration: fraction of held-out cases whose realized cascade lands inside the predicted window with a 1.5× upper tolerance. Per-dimension Brier scoring follows in a later release, once the registry carries resolved predictions.
Leave-one-out, three baselines, nine event-response pairs
The most-common-by-category and nearest-neighbor baselines clear two-thirds framing accuracy and about 0.44 tier mean absolute error on a 1–5 ordinal — respectable for a nine-case eval set — but lever F1 sits at the floor across the closed seven-way set, because the modal response inside each event category masks the lever the realized response actually used. Doctrinal retrieval has to beat this on lever F1 first, then on window calibration. The current stub is the staging ground; the language-model swap is the experiment. The full backtest table is the bottom block on the Live forecast tab above.
What v0 cannot honestly claim
Quote provenance is incomplete at first release.Every one of the twelve anchor passages ships with a placeholder tag on the English text. Speaker, venue, and date are independently verified; the working English is editorial paraphrase grounded in the dossier's reading of the primary record. The placeholder gate is deliberate — a falsifiable-prediction project cannot ship fabricated quotation — but it is a real limitation until the verbatim-verification pass lands.
The eval set is small. The leave-one-out backtest runs on nine event-response pairs. That is enough to separate framing top-1 accuracy from a uniform-random floor and enough to expose lever F1 as the hard frontier, but it is not enough to lock in a confidence interval on any metric. The eval set will widen to roughly thirty pairs in a future release. Until that lands, treat every single number on the backtest table as a directional signal, not a calibrated rate.
The taxonomies are closed.Seven frames, five tiers, seven levers, and a window in integer days. That is the entire output space. The closure is a design choice — it makes the predictor scoreable — but it costs the predictor any frame the corpus has not named yet. If a 2027 response invents a new register (the way new quality productive forces emerged in 2023–2024), the current taxonomy will mis-map it.
The corpus is time-asymmetric.Six of the twelve anchors are Xi-era (2012–2024). Two are Mao, two are Deng, one is Jiang, one is Hu. That weighting reflects the empirical observation that current state-media editorials cite Xi much more than they cite Deng or Hu — but it also means the prior systematically over-weights the post-2012 frame distribution.
Three anchors are flagged but not loaded at first release.Xi's 2017 19th Congress political report, the August 2021 common-prosperity speech, and the 2024 Third Plenum communique are flagged as known gaps but are not in the first-release retrieval index. Predictions in the interim do not draw on those anchors. They are loaded in a later update.
The registry is append-only. Every prediction is timestamped at write time and never edited. If a prediction is found to be wrong about the event rather than the response, it is annotated, not deleted. The May 2026 live call resolves on 7 February 2027 either way.
Seven choices the v0 gate does not foreclose
i. Translation of record.When PRC English diverges from the Western analyst translations (CSIS, MERICS, Brookings), which translation does the public-facing corpus show by default? The working recommendation is the PRC text with a translator's-note toggle exposing the divergence.
ii. Common-prosperity coverage.The current eval set is scoped to externally triggered responses and underweights common prosperity as a frame. Adding two or three internally triggered events — the 2021 platform crackdown, the real-estate intervention — as a separate sub-set is the natural extension.
iii. New quality productive forces versus classical self-reliance. From 2024 forward, state media use the new-quality-productive-forces register and the self-reliance register interchangeably. Keeping them as two frames is the right call: the lever implications differ (the productive-forces register clusters to subsidy responses, classical self-reliance to retaliatory export controls plus talent restriction).
iv. Hu Jintao corpus weight. Hu-era doctrine is rarely invoked in current state media but is diagnostically valuable as the peaceful-rise counter-anchor. The working recommendation is to keep it in the corpus with low retrieval weight.
v. Real-time corpus ingest cadence.Daily ingest of People's Daily, Xinhua, and Qiushi with weekly editorial-vector recomputation, matching the auto-research loop cadence.
vi. Passage source weighting.The current weighting puts Xi-era state media at 1.0 and historical anchors at 0.6 — modest, not aggressive. The auto-research loop is the better mechanism for empirically learned weights.
vii. Live-case publication policy. Publish live ex-ante predictions before the realized response, even at the cost of being publicly wrong. The May 2026 talent-curb prediction is the proof of concept; publishing only post-hoc would compromise the falsifiability claim.
The audit pass, then the schema, then the corpus widening
Three things follow this release immediately. First, a verbatim-verification audit pass: walk every anchor passage back to its primary source, flip eleven of twelve from placeholder to verified, surface the translation discrepancies the audit turns up. Second, a schema extension: make translation variants queryable from code rather than buried in editorial notes, and surface the doctrinally heaviest discrepancies on the live page. Third, load the three deferred Xi-era anchors: the corpus widens from twelve to fifteen, closing the post-2017 gap this release ships with. The live prediction resolves on 7 February 2027 regardless.