The three Xi-era texts no Beijing forecast can ignore — now loaded.

The corpus widens from twelve to fifteen anchors

The founding paper shipped with twelve doctrinal anchors and flagged three more as known gaps: Xi Jinping's 2017 19th Congress political report, the August 2021 Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting on common prosperity, and the 2024 Third Plenum communique. The first two were deferrals; the third was a calendar dependency — and was misdated in the founding dossier as “2025.” This release loads all three into the live retrieval index. The corpus widens from twelve to fifteen anchors. The verified count rises from eleven to fourteen. The single placeholder count holds at one (the August 2020 People's Daily editorial on dual circulation, still pending print-archive retrieval). The temporal corpus diagram and the rail-walker label layout regenerate against the larger anchor set.

Three texts that anchor the modern playbook

Each of the three loaded texts carries doctrinal weight no other anchor in the corpus carries. Xi's 19th Congress report is where “socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era” gets canonized. It is also where the “principal contradiction” gets rewritten from the 1981 formulation (between productive forces and material needs) to the 2017 formulation (between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing needs for a better life). That rewriting is what licenses the common-prosperity register that arrives four years later.

The August 2021 Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting is where common prosperity stops being a recurring rhetorical theme and becomes an organizing framework, with the “primary distribution, redistribution, and third distribution” coordination explicitly named. Every PRC platform crackdown or anti-monopoly action since 2021 routes through this passage's authority.

The 2024 Third Plenum communique is the most recent doctrinal text in the corpus — the institutional confirmation that the Xi-era's “further comprehensively deepen reform” agenda survives into the second half of the decade. For a predictor that has to forecast 2026–2027 PRC responses, missing the 2024 Third Plenum is missing the most recent doctrinal evidence on what the state thinks the reform agenda actually is.

Together, the three texts fill the corpus's most consequential temporal gap. The original corpus ran from Mao 1949 to Xi's 2024 productive-forces essay with no Xi-era anchor between 2012 (the Chinese Dream speech) and 2018 (the self-reliance keynote at the Chinese Academy of Sciences), and no anchor at all between the 2022 Taiwan white paper and the 2024 essay. This release closes both gaps.

Loaded against primary sources, with the new variant schema in place

Each of the three anchors was loaded against a primary or canonical source, in the same audit register as the verbatim-verification pass earlier in the spring. Xi 2017 was verified against the China Daily official English; the verbatim “new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” phrase and the principal-contradiction reformulation were both confirmed against the source. The 2021 common-prosperity meeting was verified against the gov.cn / Xinhua-sourced readout; the verbatim Chinese on common prosperity and third distribution was confirmed. The 2024 Third Plenum communique was verified against the gov.cn Chinese communique; the “further comprehensively deepen reform” passage and the Chinese-style modernization framing were both confirmed.

All three load under the translation-variant schema introduced in the previous release, which means any discrepancies surfaced during the load can be captured as first-class data rather than retrofitted into editorial notes. None of the three loaded with HIGH-load variants in this pass; the schema is in place for future audit cycles to add them.

The founding dossier listed the third anchor as the “2025 third-plenum communique.” The actual Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee was held 15–18 July 2024. The dating is corrected on the loaded entry.

Verified count moves from eleven to fourteen; the deferred list is empty

The corpus now carries fifteen doctrinal anchors. Fourteen are primary-source verified; one (the August 2020 People's Daily editorial on dual circulation) remains a placeholder pending print-archive retrieval. The list of pending anchors is now empty, retained in the code as a historical scaffold rather than deleted.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. The principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved.

The Hu-era peaceful-rise counter-anchor (the 2007 Scientific Outlook speech) is no longer the most recent pre-Xi anchor in the corpus; it now sits between Jiang Zemin's 1995 Eight Points and a Xi-era cluster that runs 2012, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2024. The Xi-era weighting that the founding dossier flagged as a limitation is now even more pronounced — nine of fifteen anchors are Xi-era — but the trade is intentional: the predictor needs the modern doctrinal vocabulary, and the modern vocabulary is overwhelmingly Xi.

The temporal corpus diagram regenerates against the larger anchor set; the rail-walker layout, which assigns each anchor's rotated label to one of five rails by perpendicular-distance optimization, handles the densified Xi-era cluster without manual intervention.

What loading these three opens

The three loaded texts each shift retrieval behavior on different categories of event. The 2017 principal-contradiction reformulation is the canonical authority for any response that frames a foreign action as a development-stage matter rather than a security matter — for example, commerce-ministry responses that justify subsidy expansion on “balanced development” grounds. The August 2021 common-prosperity speech is the authority for any response that pivots from confrontation to redistribution — PRC platform-crackdown actions reframed as anti-monopoly enforcement rather than sectoral retaliation. The 2024 Third Plenum is the authority for any response that invokes the reform agenda explicitly — particularly relevant to distinguishing the modern “new quality productive forces” register from classical self-reliance.

For the live May 2026 talent-curb prediction (resolving 7 February 2027): the retrieval set was computed against the original twelve-anchor corpus and remains the published prediction. The three new anchors do not retroactively change it — the append-only registry rule means recomputing the retrieval set against an expanded corpus would constitute editing the registry. The next live prediction will be the first one to retrieve against the full fifteen-anchor corpus.

On the question of Hu-era corpus weight: the densified Xi-era set reinforces the case for keeping the 2007 Scientific Outlook in the corpus with low retrieval weight, since it is now the sole pre-Xi anchor on the peaceful-rise / common-prosperity axis. On the question of distinguishing the modern productive-forces register from classical self-reliance: the corpus now carries Xi 2017 (which uses neither register explicitly), Xi 2021 on common prosperity (which uses neither), and the 2024 Third Plenum (which uses Chinese-style modernization), giving the retrieval system more granular frame distinctions to learn on.

What loading three anchors does not close

The Xi-era skew widens.Nine of fifteen anchors are now Xi-era. The prior over current PRC frame distributions becomes even more confident in the modern Xi vocabulary, which is the right calibration for 2026–2027 predictions but a worse calibration for any retrospective scoring against pre-2012 events.

No new event-response pairs. The nine-pair eval set is unchanged. The widened corpus changes the retrieval set on the prediction call; it does not change the baseline backtest, the lever F1 numbers, or the framing top-1 numbers. Those move only when the eval set itself widens.

No translation variants on the loaded entries.The three anchors load with empty variant tuples. That is appropriate for the first-load audit cycle but is unlikely to be the final state — the 2017 report in particular has well-documented divergences between the PRC official English and the Western translation registers.